Case Comment: GDC v Nabeel Aga [2025] EWCA Civ 68

Readers may be familiar with the legal debate surrounding immediate suspension orders under the Dentists Act 1984, which has been coined by some as the ‘Saga of Aga’. The case has sparked significant discussion regarding whether time spent under an immediate suspension order should count towards the overall substantive suspension period.

Background

The question at the heart of the ‘Saga of Aga‘ is whether the time a dentist spends under an immediate suspension order should be deducted from the substantive suspension period. Typically, when the General Dental Council (GDC) suspends a practitioner following a fitness to practise hearing, there is a 28-day period before the suspension takes effect. However, the GDC can order that the suspension begins immediately if it deems it necessary for public protection. The legal issue was whether this immediate suspension period should count towards the overall period of suspension imposed.

Two High Court cases reached conflicting conclusions on this matter. In Aga v General Dental Council [2023] EWHC 3208 (Admin), Ritchie J ruled that the immediate suspension order and the substantive suspension were part of a single continuous suspension period. Consequently, he held that the time already served under an immediate suspension should be deducted from the final sanction. Ritchie J reasoned that failing to do so would circumvent the statutory maximum suspension period and effectively penalise registrants for appealing their sanction. This decision was later challenged in PSA v GDC & Danial [2024] EWHC 2610 (Admin), where Morris J came to the opposite conclusion, ruling that immediate suspension and substantive suspension were separate, and that time spent under an immediate order should not be deducted from the substantive period.

Given the inconsistency, the case proceeded to the Court of Appeal for final resolution.

Decision

The Court of Appeal overturned Ritchie J’s decision in Aga and upheld the ruling in Danial. The court confirmed that an immediate suspension order and a substantive suspension order are legally distinct. While a substantive suspension order is imposed as a final sanction, an immediate suspension order is a temporary measure to protect the public while an appeal is pending.

The Court of Appeal found that the Dentists Act 1984 does not provide for any deduction of time served under an immediate suspension. The legislation clearly distinguishes between a direction for substantive suspension and an orderfor immediate suspension. A substantive suspension takes effect only once the appeal period has expired or after the appeal is resolved. Until that point, the immediate suspension order serves its own independent purpose.

Lady Justice Nicola Davies, delivering the lead judgment, noted that treating the two suspension periods as continuous would create an artificial limit on the power of the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) to impose proportionate sanctions. She emphasised that the statutory scheme does not support the idea of “crediting” immediate suspension time against the final suspension period. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith and Lady Justice Whipple concurred, highlighting that while this interpretation could lead to longer total suspension periods, it aligns with the statutory framework and the overarching objective of public protection.

Comment

The Court of Appeal’s decision  reinforces the distinction between immediate and substantive suspensions. This ruling may be seen as harsh by some, particularly those concerned about fairness to registrants, as it could discourage them from appealing because time spent suspended while doing so will not be deducted from their substantive suspension order if upheld. However, it prioritises public confidence in the regulatory process. The overriding purpose of healthcare regulation is the protection of the public, ensuring that only fit and competent practitioners remain in practice. The purpose of an immediate suspension order is to prevent an unfit practitioner from practising while an appeal is ongoing. To count this period as part of the final suspension would undermine the protective effects of the GDC’s sanctioning powers.

For practitioners, this means that an appeal against a suspension may not necessarily reduce the overall time spent unable to practise. It also signals that regulators must ensure their procedures remain transparent and fair, particularly regarding the use of immediate suspension orders. This decision is now the authoritative position on the issue, closing the chapter on the Saga of Aga.

Read the full judgment here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2023/3208.html